CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM

OF SPEECH-STATE CONSTITU-

TION CREATES RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY INDEPENDENT OF FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION -State

v. Schmid, 84 N.J.

535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal granted sub nom. Princeton
University v. Schmid, 101 S. Ct. 2312 (1981).
The explicitly guaranteed right of free speech land its corollary
right of freedom of association 2 have achieved a sacrosanct position in
constitutional law. Close behind in the order of ikons is the bundle of
rights attendant upon the ownership of private property. 3 In State v.
Schmid, 4 the Supreme Court of New Jersey resolved a clash between
these conflicting rights and created a special right of access to private
property for the expression of rights associated with speech. 5 The
Schmid court relied upon the principle8 espoused by the California
Supreme Court in Robins v. Prune Yard Shopping Center7 and upheld
by the United States Supreme Court in Prune Yard Shopping Center
v. Robinss: a state constitution may provide individual freedoms of
speech and petitioning greater than those guaranteed by the first
amendment of the Federal Constitution. 9 Additionally, the state

U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV; N.J. CONsr. art. I, para. 6.
2 See, e.g., Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) (state college may not deny student
association campus privileges based upon parental organization activities); NAACP v. Button.
371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963) (state may not prevent organizational aid to members): NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (State of Alabama could not compel NAACP to release
membership lists, for to do so would impinge upon "the close nexus between the freedoms of
speech and assembly" which devolve into the "freedom to engage in association").
3 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1980); note 74 infra and accompanying
text.
4 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal granted sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid,
101 S. Ct. 2312 (1981).
IId. at 562, 423 A.2d at 629.
6 Id. at 550, 552-53, 561-62, 423 A.2d at 624, 629.
7 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
8 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
9 Id. at 80-81; 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. The Prune Yard
principle evolved through a series of California decisions. See Prune Yard, id.at 903, 592 P.2d at
342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856. Prune Yard overruled Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d
460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974) (Diamond1I), which had in turn reversed Diamond v. Bland, 3
Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970) (Diamond 1).The facts of Prune Yard were
quite similar to those of the Diamond case. 23 Cal. 3d at 903, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
855. In each instance, private parties seeking to utilize privately owned shopping centers for
dissemination of political materials were prevented from so doing by the shopping center
owners. Id. Prior to Prune Yard, the California court, relying on Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972), which held that a shopping center owner could prohibit distribution of leaflets
when they communicated no information relating to the center's business and when there was an
adequate, alternate means of communication, id. at 569-70, utilized a federal analysis to
preclude private parties from use of shopping centers for dissemination of political materials and
solicitation of petition signatures. 11 Cal. 3d at 335 n.4, 521 P.2d at 463 n.4, 113 Cal. Rptr. at
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may impose reasonable restrictions on private property under its police power if such restrictions do not constitute "a taking without just

compensation."' 0 Applying the Prune Yard principle, which was
developed in the commercial setting of a shopping center," to a
private university, the New Jersey court held that private property
held open to the public for a particular use consonant with its normal
private use may not be subjected to unreasonable restrictions upon

that use. A right of access by the public, if granted at all, may not be
limited except by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. 12
On April 5, 1978, Chris Schmid' 3 was arrested on criminal trespass charges' 4 while distributing and selling political materials for the
United States Labor Party on the main campus of Princeton Univer-

sity in New Jersey. 15 Schmid was not a student at Princeton University, 1 but a member of the Labor Party' 7 which was not "a

471 n.4. In Prune Yard, however, the California court honed its analysis so that federally
protected property rights would no longer, without inquiry, be considered to subsume state
protected speech rights. The court concluded that in light of the growing social and economic
significance of shopping centers, 23 Cal. 3d at 907, 592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858, a
restrictive reading of Lloyd would reveal no proscription on California's providing greater
protection than that provided by the first amendment. Accordingly, the court held that the
California constitution protected speech and petitioning reasonably exercised in privately owned
shopping centers. Id. at 909, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
10 23 Cal. 3d at 909, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860; 447 U.S. at 81.
" Id. at 902, 592 P.2d at 342, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
" 84 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d at 629.
" Id. at 538, 423 A.2d at 616. Steven Komm, another member of the Labor Party was also
arrested on April 5, 1978, for assisting in the distribution of political materials. Id. at 538 n.1,
423 A.2d at 616 n.I. At trial, however, the charges against him were dismissed on the state's
motion. Id. See State v. Schmid, No. SC53264 (Princeton Mun. Ct., Oct. 30, 1978).
1 84 N.J. at 541, 423 A.2d at 618. Schmid was charged as a disorderly person under N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-31 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), which provided in part:
Any person who trespasses on any lands .... forbidden so to trespass by the owner,
occupant, lessee or licensee thereof, or after public notice on the part of the owner,
occupant, lessee or licensee forbidding such trespassing .... is a disorderly person
and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $50.
Id. The offense covered by that statute was repealed in 1979 and is now contained in N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:18-3(b) (West 1980).
,184 N.J. at 538-39, 423 A.2d at 616. The materials being distributed included literature
directly related to the Newark, New Jersey, mayoral campaign, endorsing the candidacy of a
member of the United States Labor Party. Id. at 539, 423 A.2d at 616. The materials offered for
sale were position papers of the United States Labor Party, as well as general informational
Party leaflets. Id. at 538, 423 A.2d at 617.
10 Id. at 539, 423 A.2d at 618. Of special relevance in this context was the difference in
standards applied to non-students distributing political materials on campus. No permission was
required for students, but non-students had to obtain permission from university officials prior to
such distribution. Id.
17 Id. at 538, 423 A.2d at 617.
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university-affiliated or campus-based organization." 8 The Party on
several occasions had sought and been denied permission to distribute
political literature on campus. 19 The April 5, 1978, incident was not
preceded by any request for use of the campus either to distribute
political materials or to solicit contributions.2 0 Schmid's activities
resulted in his arrest and charge as a defiant trespasser under section
2A: 170-31 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated. 21 He was convicted
22
in Princeton Borough municipal court and fined $15 plus $10 costs.
Schmid appealed and at the trial de novo 2 3 Judge Schoch .4 found him

1s Id. at 539, 423 A.2d at 618. University regulations in effect at the time precluded any
unpermitted on-campus distribution of materials by off-campus organizations, but no such
regulation existed as to university affiliated organizations. Id. While expressly providing that
permission was a prerequisite for solicitation of sales, contributions, and distribution of materials
on campus, as well as on a door-to-door basis, the regulations further stated: "on the same
grounds, the campus is open to speakers whom students, faculty, or staff wish to hear, and to
recruiters for agencies and organizations in whom students or faculty have an interest." COUNCIL
OF THE PRINCETON UNIVESITY COMMUNITY, UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS (1975) (amended 1976).
These regulations were revised subsequent to the commencement of Schmid, but prior to its
conclusion. The 1979 revisions, although allowing "individuals acting on behalf of candidates for
public office or of bona fide political or religious organizations" to "obtain permission to sell or
distribute [their] political or religious literature" subject to reasonable guidelines detailing time,
place and manner restrictions, continued the university policy of regulating such activities. 84
N.J. at 540 n.2, 423 A.2d at 617 n.2. See COUNCIL OF THE PRINCE ON UNIvERsITY COMMUNITY,
UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS (1975) (amended 1979).
1984 N.J. at 539, 423 A.2d at 618.
20 Id. Schmid had attempted to utilize the Princeton campus on a prior occasion for distributing political literature, likewise without having sought permission to do so through official
Princeton channels. Id. at 541, 423 A.2d at 619. At that time his activities were terminated by a
university proctor who informed Schmid that both his presence and his activity were "forbidden." Id. Schmid was warned that he "was subject to arrest for trespassing if he entered on
campus to solicit again without university permission." Id.
21 84 N.J. at 539, 423 A.2d at 618.
22 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-31 (West 1971) (repealed 1978). 84 N.J. at 539, 423 A.2d at
618. At this juncture it was already evident that State v. Schmid was not a routine trespass case.
Judge Carchman, sitting in the Municipal Court for the Borough of Princeton, felt compelled to
take the unusual step of delivering his judgment in a twenty-four page opinion in which he
noted:
The novel issue presented is whether N.J.S.A. 2A:170-31 can be used to impose
criminal sanctions on persons engaged in activity while on the grounds of a private
residential university when such activity, if conducted on public property, would be
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
State v. Schmid, No. SC53264, Slip op. at 14 (Princeton Mun. Ct., Oct. 30, 1978) (emphasis in
original). A further indication of the unique nature of the case was Schmid's legal representation.
Jerrold Kamensky of the American Civil Liberties Union and Sanford Levinson, then a member
of the Princeton faculty, counselled the defendant. Id.
2a 84 N.J. at 541, 423 A.2d at 619. See N.J. CT. R. 3:23-8.
' See State v. Schmid, No. C138 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div., March 12, 1979).
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guilty of criminal trespass. 2 He again appealed, but while his case
was pending in the appellate division the supreme court certified it

sua sponte,28 and reversed the conviction. 27
The Supreme Court of New Jersey utilized a multi-tiered analysis
in Schmid to resolve the conflict between the speech and associational

rights of the defendant and the property and speech rights of Princeton. First, the court considered Schmid's federal claims for first
amendment protection under two separate state action theses in light
of relevant constitutional doctrine. 2 Next, the court considered

whether the New Jersey Constitution could protect Schmid's expressional rights even without a clear indication that federal protection
would suffice. 29 Last, the court faced the question whether these
independent state grounds could provide protection against the conduct of private parties that infringed upon an individual's expressional
30

freedoms.
In pursuing the first phase of its analysis, the court recognized
that "the First Amendment was designed .. . to foster unfettered
discussion and free dissemination of opinion dealing with matters of
public interest and governmental affairs." ' 31 It is, however, from
governmental interference and not from similar private intrusions
that the first amendment protects the rights of free speech and assem-

bly. 32 Concluding that public universities by definition connote state
action and involvement,33 the court viewed the possible nexus be-

tween the state and a private university as less readily apparent.3 4
The court then examined alternate state action rationales under

which the first amendment could be invoked against non-governmental or private entities. 35

It considered the "symbiotic relationship"

' 84 N.J. at 541, 423 A.2d at 619.
21 Id. at 541, 423 A.2d at 619. See N.J. CT. R. 2:12-1. At this point, upon invitation of the
court, Princeton University intervened in the appeal. 84 N.J. at 541, 423 A.2d at 618. The
Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in New Jersey also filed an amicus curiae
brief. Id.
17 84 N.J. at 569, 423 A.2d at 632.
11 Id. at 542, 423 A.2d at 619.
29 Id. at 553, 423 A.2d at 623.
a0 Id. at 560, 423 A.2d at 628.
Id. at 542, 423 A.2d at 618-19.
I'
'I Id. at 543, 423 A.2d at 619.
IId. at 535, 423 A.2d at 619. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
31 84 N.J. at 543, 423 A.2d at 619. For an extensive analysis of school and university related
rights with reference to the special doctrines of in loco parentis, public function, and access to
facilities, see Claypool, Public Forum Theory in the EducationalSetting: The FirstAmendment
and The Student Press, I U. ILL. L.F. 879 (1979).
3184 N.J. at 544-53, 423 A.2d at 620-25.
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test of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 36 which provides
that private parties in a mutually beneficial relationship with the state

may not act in a manner that impermissibly interferes with the federally granted individual rights of others. 37 The court also examined
the "extent of direct state regulation" thesis embodied in Jackson v.

Metropolitan Edison Co., 38 which is based upon the interplay of
regulation, control, and affirmative assistance between the private
entity and the state. 39 It noted that both of these approaches have
been utilized in first amendment challenges to the actions of private
universities, 40 but have failed for the most part to result in a finding of
state action. 4' The court nonetheless concluded that "the interface
between the university and the State [was] not so extensive as to
demonstrate a joint and mutual participation in higher education or
to establish an interdependent or symbiotic relationship between the
two in the field of eduction."' 42 Similarly, the court rejected the

"'close nexus" approach of Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 43 finding the

degree of state regulation insufficient concerning "the public's access

30 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
37 Id. at 723-26; 84 N.J. at 544, 423 A.2d at 619-20. In Burton, a privately owned restaurant
leasing premises within a government owned and operated parking garage was held subject to
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment via state action analysis. 365 U.S. at
723-26. Specifically, the restaurant's refusal to serve blacks was deemed a denial of equal
protection. Id.
- 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
39 Id. at 351, 357; 84 N.J. at 544, 423 A.2d at 620. Application of this standard has produced
results difficult to reconcile. In Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 342 U.S. 451 (1952), policy
decisions of a private transit company requiring governmental approval formed the basis for a
finding of state action. Id. at 463. Conversely, in Jackson, governmental approval of a request
from a regulated public utility "d[id] not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and
approved by the utility commission into 'state action.'" 419 U.S. at 357. Although it has been
suggested that the "extent of regulation" test has replaced the "symbiotic relationship" test of
Burton, Greene v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 469 F. Supp. 187, 194-95 (D. Md. 1979), the distinction
is still viable. Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978).
10 84 N.J. at 545, 423 A.2d at 620. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121, 122-24
(6th Cir. 1971); Greene v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 469 F. Supp. 187, 196-98 (D. Md. 1979).
4, 84 N.J. at 545-46, 423 A.2d at 620. The court suggested that since most of the private
university state action cases have involved the "internal affairs of the particular institution," a
different result might be had where the conduct of the "general public vis-a-vis the institutions"
was at issue. Id. at 546 n.5, 423 A.2d at 621 n.5.
42 Id. at 548, 423 A.2d at 621.
43 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The "close nexus" approach requires that before state action can be
found based upon the relationship between the parties, the state must do more than merely
acquiesce in the actions of the private party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170
(1970). Absent a "sufficiently close nexus" between the regulatory or ministerial function exercised by the state and the impermissible acts of the private party, state action cannot exist. Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978). See also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357; Moose Lodge,
407 U.S. at 190.
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to the university campus" 4 and, "the distribution of political litera' 45
ture or other expressional activities.

Turning to the public function doctrine, the Schmid court once
again analyzed Princeton's activities to determine if they constituted
state action. 46 Under this theory, if a private entity is devoted to a

large extent to public uses, then it may be necessary for the entity to
honor first amendment rights. 47 The court examined two instances in
which sufficient devotion
to public use has been found-the so-called
"company-town" cases 48 and the "shopping center" cases4 -and then
attempted to apply the rationales of those decisions to the facts of
Schmid. In Marsh v. Alabama, 50 the United States Supreme Court
held that where a company-owned town provides the services and
benefits generally associated with a municipality it is "subject to the

strictures of the first amendment." 51 Although the company-town
rationale was extended for a short period of time to privately owned
shopping malls, 52 the Supreme Court in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner53 held
that distribution of anti-war handbills could be barred. 54 The Lloyd
Court stressed that alternative means of communication existed and

that the expressional activities at issue were unrelated to the shopping
center's business. 55 Moreover, the invitation for public use of the
shopping center was not "open-ended" or for "any and all purposes." 56 Subsequent decisions reinforced the Lloyd Court's determi-

" 84 N.J. at 548, 423 A.2d at 621-22.

11 Id., 423 A.2d at 622.
46 Id. at 549. 423 A.2d at 622.
47 Id.; see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
40 84 N.J. at 549, 551-52, 423 A.2d at 622-24; e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
4, 84 N.J. at 549-52, 423 A.2d at 622-24; e.g., Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976);
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
- 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
" 84 N.J. at 549, 423 A.2d at 622; see Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503, 508-09.
'z See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 524 (1976) (supporting view that Lloyd effectively overruled Logan Valley and, thus, expressional activities in private mall were not protected by first amendment); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 564-65 (1972) (distinguishing
Logan Valley on grounds that subject of handbills distributed in Lloyd were unrelated to
business of shopping mall); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 317, 322-23 (1968) (privately owned shopping mall held to be
strikingly similar to company-owned town, and therefore subject to union members' first
amendment rights to picket non-unionized store in mall).
"3 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
11 Id. at 566-67.
ss Id. at 564-67.
5 Id. at 565.
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nation that expressional activities taking place in private shopping
57
malls are not protected by the first amendment.
Assessing the validity of Schmid's federal claim under the Lloyd

rationale, the Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that "it would
be difficult to [find] under the circumstances ...

that Princeton

University is directly subject to First Amendment strictures." 5 8 The
court noted that readily available public streets and public facilities

for promulgation of and discourse on political and societal affairs
would fulfill the alternative means of communication exception. 50
Furthermore, recognizing that public uses and expressional activities
are subordinate to Princeton's overall educational policies, the Schmid

court concluded that the university's invitation to the public, as in
Lloyd, though broad was neither "open-ended" nor "for any and all

purposes." 60 Similarly, although "the public's invitation to use the
college facilities is incident to the educational life at the institution,"
Princeton could not be considered "the functional equivalent of a
"company town.' "61 Upon completion of its thorough odyssey
through the stormy seas of state action, 2 the court concluded that the

57 E.g., Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980): Hudgens v. N.L.R.B.,
424 U.S. 507 (1967).
84 N.J. at 550-51, 423 A.2d at 623.
50 Id. at 551, 423 A.2d at 623; see Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 566-67.
6 84 N.J. at 551, 423 A.2d at 623. Therefore, even though Princeton's educational purposes
were more closely related to expressional freedoms than a shopping center's purposes might be.
"'attachment of First Amendment requirements to the University by virtue of the general public's
permitted access to its property would still be problematic." Id. at 551, 423 A.2d at 623.
61 id. at 552, 423 A.2d at 624.
62 Id. at 553, 423 A.2d at 624. The court, in its analysis of the ability of state action theory to
reach the actions of private parties or private interests, relegated the potentially most powerful
"process of court" theory of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1968), to a footnote. 84 N.J. at 548
n.6, 423 A.2d at 622 n.6. Shelley held that the judicial enforcement of private rights, in itself,
constitutes state action. 334 U.S. at 19. If the holding in Shelley were strictly applied, any resort
to judicial process to enforce a private right would constitute state action, effectively eliminating
any distinction between state and private action. As the Schmid court noted, however, application of the process of court theory is delimited by the nature of the rights asserted. 84 N.J. at 548
n.6, 423 A.2d at 622 n.6. Thus, the inherent weakness of state action analysis becomes clear; the
nature of the substantive question dictates the efficacy of the jurisdictional tool. See generally
Note, State Action: Theories For Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74
COLuM. L. REv. 656, 672-80 (1974). See also Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 100, 161. 172-75
(1975); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417 n.5 (1968).
Surprisingly, the court did not consider the most far reaching, albeit ephemeral. application
of state action in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In that case, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the California Supreme Court that an amendment added
to the state constitution by initiative impermissibly impinged upon the guarantees of equal
protection of the fourteenth amendment; the amendment effectively created a private right to
discriminate in the sale and rental of housing space. Id. at 374. The Reitman Court held that the
existence and application of the constitutional provision would directly involve the state "in
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contrapuntal nature of the policy concerns, combined with the clash

in constitutional values at stake, required forebearance in extension of
the first amendment to protect Schmid from Princeton. 3
Analysis of Schmid's assertion of alternate protection of his rights
on state constitutional grounds required the court to review recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court that upheld extensions of
individual rights by states beyond the federal guarantees of the United
States Constitution. 6 4 The court also reviewed the recent history of
its own extensions of such rights in holdings that liberally construed

the state constitution.6 5 In view of both the decisional law66 and the
more expansive language of New Jersey's Constitution, 67 the court
determined that the state constitution imposed an affirmative burden
on the state to protect fundamental personal rights through action,

not merely to avoid abridging such rights. 68
Although recognizing that the constraints of federalism and the
fourteenth amendment's requirement of state action are absent in the
enforcement of state-based constitutional rights, 9 the court suggested

private racial discrimination to an unconstitutional degree." Id. at 380. Had the Schmid court
considered the rationale of Reitman, it might have struck down the application of its criminal
trespass law as overbroad under a state action theory.
8 84 N.J. at 553, 423 A.2d at 624.
Id. Again the Schmid court relied on Prune Yard, in this instance, for the broadly held and
little disputed proposition that "state constitutional guarantees of . . . rights may surpass...
federal." Id. See Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 489, 495-98 (1977) (viability of trend to expand guarantees of Bill of Rights lies in state
court decisions). See also Mosk, The New States Rights, 10 CAL. L. ENFORCEMENT J. 81 (1976).
s 84 N.J. at 555-57, 423 A.2d at 625. See also Brennan, supra note 64, at 499-501.
84 N.J. at 556-57, 423 A.2d at 625-26 (citing recent instances of state court extended
protection to rights either within or closely associated with first amendment- freedom of press
and associational rights).
87 Id. The relevant sections of New Jersey's constitution may be found in article one.
Paragraph six provides: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press ...." N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6. In addition,
paragraph eighteen provides: "The people have the right freely to assemble together, to consult
for the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to petition for
redress of grievances." Id., para. 18.
The federal provision, however, is less expansive: "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
84 N.J. at 559, 423 A.2d at 628. The principle may also be stated as a prohibition upon the
state from asserting interests contrary to those of the individual. Although it is uncontested that
the state does have an affirmative duty "to protect fundamental rights," id., the Schmid court
neglected to provide an analytical framework to supply the missing "from whom." See In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 30, 355 A.2d 647, 657 (1976) (suggesting that affirmative obligation of state
is to protect individual from state).
84 N.J. at 559-60, 423 A.2d at 628-29.
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meaningful parallels might exist between the federal and state constitutions "especially in the areas where constitutional values are shared,
such as speech and assembly." ' 70 Through this parallel analysis, the
court broadened the reach of the state constitution to actions of private parties who have "assumed a constitutional obligation not to
abridge the individual exercise of such freedoms because of the public
7
use of their property." '

The Schmid court also acknowledged the need to strike a delicate
balance between expressional rights and property rights, coupled with
the need and mandate to protect private property "from untoward
interference with or confiscatory restrictions upon its reasonable use"
72
that would amount to an unjust taking under the state constitution.
The court made it clear that public policy, public welfare, and the
paramount nature of the rights embodied within the guarantee of free
speech could delimit the bounds of the rights devolved to the owner of
private property. 73 The state constitutional grounds for upholding
Schmid's right of access to a private university for expressional purposes were founded upon the Prune Yard principle that the more
private property is dedicated to public use, the more it must "accommodate" individual rights. 74 The court also "look[ed] to [New Jersey's] own strong traditions which prize the exercise of individual
rights and stress the societal obligations that are concomitant to public
enjoyment of private property.

75

7o Id. at 560, 423 A.2d at 628. The court noted that both the federal and state constitutions
protect expressional values, and somewhat enigmatically pointed out that even absent application of the federal constitution's fourteenth amendment the state may not abridge "'the liberty of
speech." Id., 423 A.2d at 629.
71 Id. When a private property owner permits public use of his property, he may assume a
constitutional obligation to protect expressional activities. Id. at 560-62, 423 A.2d at 628-29. In
view of this novel type of "adverse user" doctrine, Princeton University's trespass action may be
the only effective means to foreclose the defense of acquiescence.
71 Id. at 561, 423 A.2d at 628-29. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1980) (an
enforced right of access that either actually or theoretically alters the owner's right to exclude
public falls within category of property interests which government could not take without
compensation).
73 84 N.J. at 561, 423 A.2d at 629.
74 Id. at 562, 423 A.2d at 629.
75 Id., 423 A.2d at 429. See also State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 305-08, 277 A.2d 369, 371-72
(1971); Zelenka v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 129 N.J. Super. 379, 386-87, 324 A.2d
35, 38-39 (App. Div. 1974), certil. denied, 66 N.J. 317, 331 A.2d 17 (1974). But cJ. State v.
Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 411, 416 A.2d 821, 826 (1980) ("[p]olitical speech... occupies a preferred
position in our system of constitutionally-protected interests").
The Schmid court's analogies drawn from Shack, Miller, and Zelenka may be viewed as
obverse rather than parallel. The court stated that "to protect free speech and petitioning is a
goal that surely matches the protecting of... property values and other societal goals that have
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Under the state constitution, the decisional criteria used by the
Schmid court embodied a multi-faceted balancing test to weigh competing interests of private property rights against expressional
values. 76 The "normal" use of private property and the extent of the
owner's invitation to the public to use the private property were
viewed in light of the similarity between private use of the specific
property and the attempted public use. 77 According to this test, an
owner of private property who is required "to honor" speech and
assembly rights of others may fashion reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions to limit expressional activity.78 Moreover, courts
evaluating the reasonableness of the restrictions may consider the
existence of "alternate means of communication. 79
In applying its test, the court determined that Princeton's primary purpose was education and all it encompasses, 80 that the
campus was held open for public use, 8'and that Schmid's "attempt to
disseminate political material was not incompatible with either Princeton University's professed educational goals or the University's overall use of its property for educational purposes. '8 2 The court recognized the importance of institutional integrity as well as the independence of private educational institutions, and the concomitant

been held to justify reasonable restrictions on private property rights." 84 N.J. at 562, 423 A.2d
at 629 (citing Prune Yard, 23 Cal. 3d at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859). Yet the
issue in Schmid was whether the state could impose access to private property by private parties,
not whether the owner of such property may violate local statutes by speaking, for example,
through signage as in Miller. A more appropriate parallel, unused by the court, would be to ask
whether the state may impose upon the owners of property an unwanted expression of speech.
See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking down New Hampshire's requirement that motorists use license plates carrying motto "Live Free or Die").
76 84 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d at 628.
77 Id. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630. The court, however, did not determine whether Schmid's
activities truly constituted "public use." Schmid never attempted to make any showing that
either university affiliated individuals or townspeople wished to hear him. Although doctrinally
proper, reference to Schmid's use as public is factually incorrect: he was a private party seeking
to use private property for private purposes.
7184 N.J. at 564,423 A.2d at 630-31. Cf. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (public
may be prohibited from demonstrating on grounds of county jail); American Future Syss. Inc. v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 618 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1980) (state university regulation forbidding sales demonstrations and solicitation in university owned and operated residence halls is
constitutional); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968) (regulations may limit public's use of public property for expressional activity to
ensure that activity does not interfere with the use to which property is dedicated).
79 84 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630.
- Id. at 564, 423 A.2d at 630.
81Id. at 564-65, 423 A.2d at 631.
11Id. at 565, 423 A.2d at 631.
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need to control those who seek to enter the institutional domain.8 3 It

nevertheless found that the University's regulations governing public
use of the campus were devoid of standards concerning "the actual
exercise of expressional freedom" except "the requirement for 8invita4
tion and permission," and, therefore, they were unreasonable.
Accordingly, the court held that Schmid's expressional rights

required Princeton's accommodation of his presence on campus and
that such state enforced access did not constitute an unconstitutional
abridgement of the university's property rights. 85 The court reversed

Schmid's conviction, "because no reasonable regulatory scheme was
provided as a basis to either evict Schmid or secure his arrest for

criminally defiant trespass. 87 The nature of Schmid's activities raised
them to a level protected by the state constitution; the unreasonable

impairment of those rights was held unconstitutional. 88
Had the Supreme Court of New Jersey validated an enforceable
right of access to the private property of Princeton based upon Schmid's claim of a federal right, the result, although somewhat novel,
would be less than startling. 89 It might be viewed as recognition of
another high priority interest of a magnitude and importance, such as
racial discrimination, that requires or allows a strict extension of state
action theory to reach the acts of private parties. 90 The court specifi-

83 Id. at 566-67, 423 A.2d at 632. The court further related the need for controlling access to
"implicat[ions] [of] academic freedom and development." Id. at 566, 423 A.2d at 631. After
acknowledging precedents that allowed regulation of activities that affect the achievement of
educational goals within public education facilities, id. at 567, 423 A.2d at 632, the court
suggested that a broader standard might apply in a private context: -[H]ence, private colleges
and universities must be accorded a generous measure of autonomy and self-government if they
are to fulfill their paramount role as vehicles of education and enlightenment." Id. at 567, 423
A.2d at 632. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
84 84 N.J. at 567-68, 423 A.2d at 732-33. Although the court suggested that "there were no
standards extant regulating the granting or withholding of' access to and use of university
property, id. at 567, 423 A.2d at 632, there was in effect at the time of Schmid's arrest a rather
unrestrictive, if not prosaic standard, that anyone may utilize the campus for political or
charitable solicitation unless no one at Princeton wished to hear him or wished others to hear
him. For the text of the regulations from which this standard could be derived, see note 18 supra.
85 84 N.J. at 568, 423 A.2d at 632.
88 Id. at 569, 423 A.2d at 632.
87 Ids at 568, 423 A.2d at 632.
- Id. at 568-69, 423 A.2d at 633.
89 See id. at 544-48, 423 A.2d at 619-22. See notes 35-45 supra and accompanying text.
0 Interests that tend to trigger application of state action doctrine quite readily are racial
discrimination, 84 N.J. at 548 n.6, 423 A.2d at 620 n.6, and violation of the "establishment of
religion" clause of the first amendment. State v. Celmar, 80 N.J. 405, 413-14, 404 A.2d 1, 6
(1979) (striking down state's grant of secular authority to Ocean Grove Camp Authority). See
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cally declined to reach that conclusion, which suggests that the protected interests associated with the first amendment are not sufficiently important to extend federal guarantees of access to private
university property by virtue of state action doctrine.9 1 Prior decisions indicate a denial of the reach of state action to the private
university setting in the substantive contexts of admissions policy, 9 2
faculty employment, student discipline,9 3 and internal institutional
affairs.9 4 Although the circumstances and substantive rights involved
differed, in each instance the overriding decisional criteria was the
private character of the institution involved, not the nature of the
claim of right or the source of the right. 95 For the Schmid court to
base its decision on federal grounds, it merely would have been required to find sufficient involvement between the university and the
state to hold the campus public rather than private property. 96 Such
a finding would have precluded the necessity of looking to independent state grounds, 9 7 thereby avoiding the creation of a state rule of
decision involving forced rights of access and use by private parties of
the private property of another."
The state grounds approach is disarmingly simple at first glance.
The court noted in great detail the prior history of the extension of

Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492-95 (1960) (declaration of belief in God improper requirement for holding state office); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 150 (1943) ("freedom of
religion has a higher dignity under the Constitution than municipal or personal convenience").
0184 N.J. at 548, 423 A.2d at 621-22. In view of the test ultimately developed by the court to
establish New Jersey state constitutional power to enforce a right of access, see notes 76-79 supra
and accompanying text, the earliest federal test would also seem apropos: "Ownership does not
always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the rights. . .of
those who use it." Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.
01See Williams v. Howard Univ., 528 F.2d 658, 660 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850
(1976); Spark v. Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per
curiam). See also Dickey v. Alabama, 273 F.Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), dismissed as moot sub
nom. Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968).
"' See cases collected by the Schmid court at 84 N.J. at 546, 423 A.2d at 620. See generally
Claypool, supra note 34.
'1 84 N.J. at 546 n.5, 423 A.2d at 62 n.5.
s See note 41 supra.
" Such a holding automatically would have involved state action analysis. See Burton, 365
U.S. at 715. Princeton, then nominally acting as the state, could not have precluded Schmid
from carrying out his activities on what constituted public property. Clearly, citizens may use
public grounds to convey their ideas about the body politic, subject only to reasonable restrictions. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
97 84 N.J. at 546, 423 A.2d at 621.
08 84 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630.
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guarantees under state constitutions in New Jersey and elsewhere
beyond those of the Federal Constitution. " Further, emphasis was
placed upon the special significance of the legislative history of New
Jersey's constitutional provisions "with respect to individual rights of
speech and assembly" 00 and its variation in source and language from
the first amendment.' 0 l The court, in its analysis, also stressed the
historical precedents it had established in extending guarantees of
liberty, especially in the area of fundamental individual rights.' 02
Against this background, the court concluded that "the state constitution imposes upon the state government an affirmative obligation to
protect [those) . . . rights."'0 3

Review of the decisions protecting individual rights, 0 4 however,
suggests that the court's analogies are imperfect. For example, in
examining the state guarantee of freedom of speech and its corollary
freedom of press the court did not distinguish between freedom from
the power of the court as an arm of the state, and freedom from the
acts of a private party.' 05 Despite its failure to provide a logical
springboard in New Jersey precedent, the court concluded that "rights
of speech and assembly guaranteed by the state constitution are protectable.

. .

against government bodies.

.

.[and) private persons as

well."10 6 Further support for this conclusion was found by the court

99 Id. at 553-54, 423 A.2d at 624. Again citing Prune Yard, the Schmid court pointed to the
breadth and depth of the issues resolved and the trend foreshadowed by the private writings of
court members. Id. For a discussion of New Jersey's early role in enhancing individual rights
under state constitutional construction, see Brennan, supra note 64, at 499.
10084 N.J. at 557-58, 423 A.2d at 626-27.
101Id. at 557, 423 A.2d at 626. The court pointed to two separate provisions of the New Jersey
constitution protecting speech and expressional freedoms. Id. See note 67 supra. Furthermore, in

the opinion of the court, the state constitution could be viewed as an independent source of rights

..even if the language.

.

.[were) identical [with the]

.

.

federal," 84 N.J. at 557 n.8, 423 A.2d

at 628 n.8, because its source was the early constitution of New York which predated the federal
constitution. Id. at 557, 423 A.2d at 626-27.
10284 N.J. at 556, 559, 423 A.2d at 626, 628.
103Id. at 559, 423 A.2d at 628.
104 Id. at 555, 556, 559, 423 A.2d at 626-28.
'05 Id. at 556, 423 A.2d at 626. Arguably, the criminal law as expressed in the defiant
trespasser statute constituted the arm of the state in this context. See note 14 supra and
accompanying text.
106
84 N.J. at 556, 423 A.2d at 626. The Schmid court's survey of state decisional and statutory
law, however, did not support its conclusion. In State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369
(1971), for example, the court vacated trespass convictions of Office of Economic Opportunity
workers for entering onto private farms. Id. at 308, 277 A.2d at 375. The decisional basis was
posited on state law barring the property owner from precluding administrative inspections, not
on constitutional grounds. Id. at 302, 277 A.2d at 371-72. Similarly, in State v. Kolcz, 114 N.J.
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in the parallel drawn between the first amendment prohibition
against government interference with individual rights of speech and
a similar provision in the New Jersey Constitution. 107 Thus, the
court, without either precedential or statutory authority that would
logically confer such power, adopted a rule of decision that elevated
the guarantees of one private party at the expense of another.
Within the framework of the Schmid court's analysis of the independent state grounds, the Princeton campus was implicitly treated as
public not private property. 108 Failing to find state action by virtue
of either public function or integral government function analyses, 09
the court retraced its steps to rely upon the extent of the private
property's dedication to public use in order to determine the nature of
the restrictions that may be placed upon the private owner's enjoyment of the incidents of ownership. 110 The court recognized that a
public invitation to use private property would not necessarily convert
that property into public property;"' it also took note of proscriptions
against any undue restraint, interference, or confiscatory use that
would result in an "unjust taking" of private property. " 2 The analysis centered strictly upon an evaluation of Schmid's expressional
rights in relation to Princeton's property rights; Princeton's expressional rights were not evaluated. Nevertheless, relying on the Prune
Yard" 3 principle, the court concluded that a linchpin of its decisional

Super. 408, 276 A.2d 595 (Essex County Ct. 1971), the court reversed trespass convictions of
individuals conducting political solicitation at the retirement village of Rossmoor. There, the
holding hinged upon a "Marsh-like" rationale, not state constitutional grounds. Id. at 413-16,
276 A.2d at 598-99.
"0784 N.J. at 559, 423 A.2d at 628.
0"'See id. at 561-63, 423 A.2d at 629-30. The court made a quantum leap from the proposition that "private property may be subjected by the state. . . to reasonable restrictions upon its
use," id. at 561, 423 A.2d at 628, to the conclusion that such restriction includes private "use of
such property for speech and assembly." Id. at 562, 423 A.2d at 628.
2oQ Id. at 549, 550, 423 A.2d at 621, 622.
11 Id. at 551, 423 A.2d at 622. The court reviewed the secondary aspects of Lloyd, and
disregarded Lloyd's primary holding that it would be an "unwarranted infringement of property
rights to require them to yield to the exercise of first amendment rights . . . where adequate
alternative avenues of communication exist." 407 U.S. at 567. Despite acknowledgement of the
lessened viability of Lloyd's secondary premise, 84 N.J. at 551, 423 A.2d at 623, the court
concentrated its analysis on the suggestion in Lloyd that state action analysis might yield to a
state-based definition of property rights depending upon the purposes to which the private
property is dedicated. Id. at 551, 423 A.2d at 623.
I Id. at 551, 423 A.2d at 623.
,12 Id. at 561, 423 A.2d at 628-29.
2"3 447 U.S. at 82-83; 23 Cal. 3d at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859; 84 N.J. at
562, 423 A.2d at 629. The Schmid court's reference to Prune Yard stressed only the clash of
property and speech rights, and disregarded the expressional rights of the private property
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criteria should be that the "more a property is devoted to public use,
the more it must accommodate the rights ...of the general pub4
lic." 11
This interpretation of the Prune Yard rationale, however, fails to
effectively distinguish the facts of these cases. In sharp contrast to
Schmid's private university setting, 15 Prune Yard considered attempts
by the owners of a private shopping mall to prevent plaintiffs from
engaging in peaceful signature solicitation for a political cause. 116
The California court was not unmindful of the continuous nature of a
shopping center's open invitation to public use, 1 7 yet the basis for its
decision was the overwhelming significance of the shopping center in
the economic, social, and familial life of the Californian. 118 Thus,
the Prune Yard-Schmid distinction is not solely between the commercial nature of a shopping center and the non-commercial nature of the
university, but between a type of entity that fulfills a modest, albeit
important role in the life of individual citizens and an economic
institution that colors the life of the entire citizenry of the state.
The New Jersey court, in equating its standards in Schmid with
the rationales of the California Supreme Court in Prune Yard,I"
failed to recognize that it was not the nature of the shopping center
that required such a decision, but the nature of life in Southern
California. The concern of the California court was as much for the
rights of the listeners as it was for the rights of the speakers. 120 For in
Prune Yard, the court's conclusions embodied the concern that if
shopping center premises were unreasonably denied to political
speakers, the general public might be effectively denied significant
opportunities to hear "important discussion of items of social and

owner. Id. See notes 6, 7 & 8 supra and accompanying text. The court's reliance on Prune Yard
emphasized the possible exercise of the state police powers to allow restriction on private
property use as an analogy to State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 415, 416 A.2d 821,826 (1980) (striking
down zoning ordinance that forbade erection of political signs by homeowners as violative of
first amendment interests of property owners). This too would seem to be an imperfect comparison. In Miller, the property owners were protected from the state. Id. at 413, 416 A.2d at 827.
The principle cited in Prune Yard, however, is one which would allow the state to impose
restrictions on the property owner. 447 U.S. at 82-83.
14 84 N.J. at 562, 423 A.2d at 629. The court reached this conclusion despite its previous
acknowledgement that the devotion to use holding was the secondary and since diminished
holding of Lloyd. Id. at 551, 423 A.2d at 623. See note 110 supra.
Is'84 N.J. at 538-41, 423 A.2d at 616-18.
"6 23 Cal. 3d at 902, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
,17Id. at 906, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
118 Id., 592 P.2d at 350, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
" 84 N.J. at 562-63, 423 A.2d at 629.
12023 Cal. 3d at 906, 592 P.2d at 350, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
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political importance."' 2 ' No such risk existed at Princeton. 122 The
Schmid court did not address this issue, but focused instead upon the

expressional rights of Schmid balanced against the property rights of
Princeton 2 3 without evaluation of the extrinsic circumstances that
dictated the holding in Prune Yard. 124 The court buttressed its argument with references to cases that dealt strictly with publicly owned
and operated property or facilities 2 5 but eschewed its own decisions
that required findings of either company-town analogies 126 or public
function usurpation. 27 Absent Prune Yard-type findings, 28 the
court's decisional theory was merely a self-created state action rule of
decision. 29 It implicitly deemed Princeton's campus to be public
property. 130 Moreover, even if one accepts the validity of the Schmid
test for determining the nature and extent to which private property

may be subjected to an enforced right of access for expressional activities, ' 3' the court's application of the test to Princeton University must

at 907, .592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
84 N.J. at 551, 423 A.2d at 623. Public streets, public areas, and public access ways
provided numerous readily used places in which to speak, meet, listen, and exchange ideas. Id.
I" Id. at 551, 423 A.2d 623. In its reasoning, the Schmid court noted that it was "constrained
to.. . balance between. . . private property and expressional freedom in that property." Id. at
562, 423 A.2d at 630.
"24The Schmid court never suggested that Princeton played a societal role analogous to the
shopping center in California culture. See notes 114 & 118 supra and accompanying text.
1Id.

222

12384 N.J. at 561, 423 A.2d at 629.
12 E.g., State v. Kolcz, 114 N.J. Super. 408, 276 A.2d 95 (App. Div. 1971) (upholding right

to petition in Rossmoor based upon rationale of Marsh).
127 E.g., State v. Celmer, 80 N.J. 405, 404 A.2d 1 (1979) (invalidating statutory scheme that
permitted grant of municipal powers to Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of United
Methodist Church).
See notes 118 & 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
22 For a discussion of state action rationales, see notes 31-39, 43, 47-57, & 62 supra and
accompanying text.
I3 See 84 N.J. at 568, 423 A.2d at 632-33. Public status of the Princeton campus can be
inferred from the court's suggestion that "activity reasonably exercised on private property
devoted to public use is protectable . . . and does not constitute impermissible infringement
upon private property rights." 84 N.J. at 568, 423 A.2d at 632-33. See Prune Yard, 447 U.S. at
82-84.
13284 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630. See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text. The Schmid
court essentially adopted the criteria used by the California Supreme Court in Prune Yard. See
84 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d at 629; 23 Cal. 3d at 903, 905-06, 909, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr.
at 860. Before applying its test to the case at hand, the court routinely acknowledged the
requisites of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions allowed to limit expressional
activity. 84 N.J. at 564, 423 A.2d at 630-31. After rejecting both the public invitation and
alternative means of communication standards of Lloyd in its first amendment analysis, id. at
551,423 A.2d at 623, the court stepped back and superimposed those policy considerations on its
own state level test. Id. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630.
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be questioned. The breadth of Princeton's educational purpose

2

sug-

gests that any expressional activity could constitute a protected pur-

pose under the court's analysis. Surely a band of travelling thespians
could demand access to the university with as strong an educational
rationale as exists to promote a candidacy for municipal office in a
city some fifty miles distant. 133 There is conceivably almost no expressional activity that cannot in some way be construed as having
educational value or purpose.
A further difficulty revolves around the paucity of evidence used
to support the conclusion that Princeton was held open for public
use. 3 4 Noting that public presence is not, per se, discordant with
general goals of education, 35 the court determined, in circular fashion, that if Princeton regulated the public's use of its facilities, the
regulation itself was conclusive of an invitation to use the facilities. 36 Consequently, limited invitation for public use, coupled with
regulation of that use, subjects an owner of private property to a court
construction requiring unlimited invitation and regulation by court
approval and definition, thus creating a paradox. The dysfunctional
consequence is that private property owners would be well advised to

deny access to all. The cloistered hall may properly remain so, but a
private university had best not allow limited regulated visits or public

use for fear its invitation will be held general
unreasonable. 138

37

and its regulations

The court based its determination of the extent of Princeton's
invitation to public use of its campus upon equally sparse evi-

13284 N.J. at 564-65, 423 A.2d at 631-32.
133Although it was stipulated that Schmid had distributed literature to support the United
States Labor Party candidate for Mayor of Newark, New Jersey, id. at 539, 423 A.2d at 616, no
showing was made that any eligible voters were among his prospective audience.
"3 Id. at 564-65, 423 A.2d at 631. Aside from a recitation of the court's general views on
education, and the relationship between the world of ideas and the province of education, the
record is exceedingly sparse. Id. Excessive dependence was placed upon rather general and
somewhat banal platitudes in two writings. Id. at 565 nn. 10 & 11, 423 A.2d at 631 nn.I0 & 11.
C.f. Prune Yard, 447 U.S. at 78 (stressing that "positive force of advertising" and "lure of a
congenial environment" attract 25,000 people per day to shopping center).
,35 84 N.J. at 564, 423 A.2d at 632.
1 6 Id. at 565 nn. 10 & 11, 423 A.2d at 630-31 nn. 10 & 11. The Schmid court's extension of
Princeton's regulation of particularized uses of university facilities, id., into an open invitation
for unlimited use and access is a logical nullity.
137Id. at 565, 423 A.2d at 631.
'3 Id. at 567, 423 A.2d at 632.
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dence.' 3 0 Recasting its positioning of the burden of persuasion, 4 0 the
court inferred that absent a showing by Princeton that Schmid's activities were contrary to the university's "overall uses of its property,"
Schmid's use was by implied invitation. ' 4' The court relied upon a
speech by Princeton's President Bowen as the basis for its conclusion.' 4 2 Bowen's speech typified declarations of purpose and hopes
for community involvement espoused universally by leaders of educational, civic, fraternal, religious, and charitable institutions. To suggest that an institution's generalized desire to participate in community life and to seek input from that community is indicative of an
open-ended invitation to utilize institutional property tests one's credulity. Application of the Schmid rationale raises several questions
and suggests that new clashes of individual rights will arise. If the
court has developed a "mini-state action" tool to protect substantive
individual rights from actions of private parties, can the test withstand more pointed conflicts? Concededly, Schmid's intrusion on Princeton was minimal. 113 However, the same sequential test would,
upon a declaration of ecumenism by an official representative of a
house of worship, require a finding of an invitation to public use
consistent with the pursuit of religious ideals. Similarly, other private
educational institutions would be subject to the strictures of
Schmid. 4 4 Defining the public's rights of access to private property
by virtue of the use to which the owner dedicates his property places

11

Id. at 565-66, 565 n.11, 423 A.2d at 631-632, 631 n.11. The general remarks of Princeton's
president that "the University has a responsibility to expose students and faculty members to a
wide variety of views," id. at 565 n.11, 423 A.2d at 631 n.11, coupled with Emerson's comment
that "freedom of expression is [both] an essential process of advancing knowledge and discovering truth," id., were presented by the court as useful in ascertaining the nature of the public's
invitation to use the campus. Id.
110Princeton was under no burden to overcome the lack of a record indicating that "Schmid
was evicted" because he "offended the University'fs] educational policies." Id. at 565, 423 A.2d
at 631. Princeton and Schmid stipulated to facts that made the case against Schmid a conclusive
one. Id. at 538-41, 423 A.2d at 618. See notes 14 & 18 supra and accompanying text.
1 84 N.J. at 565-66, 423 A.2d at 631-32.
142Id. at 565, 565-66 nn.10 & 11, 423 A.2d at 631-32, 631 nn. 10 & 11. See note 139 supra
and accompanying text.
', 84 N.J. at 566, 423 A.2d at 632.
144 Justices Powell and White suggest further examples in.
their concurrence in Prune Yard:
A property owner also may be faced with speakers who wish to use his premises
as a platform for views that he finds morally repugnant. A minority-owned business
confronted with leaflets from the American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a
church-operated enterprise asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortions, or a
union compelled to supply a forum to right to work advocates could be placed in an

94
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sharp limits on the owner. 145 It may be inferred from the Schmid
decision that the more a private owner seeks to use and enjoy his
property, the less likely he may be able to continue to do so free from
judicially forged fetters. 146 Logical extension of the court's reasoning
to other settings suggest that results counter-productive to the desire of
the court will occur.
If increased offers of public use are ultimately
to subject private property to public use limited only by reasonable
'47

time, place, and manner standards, the prudent private owner would
48

be wise to curtail any and all such public use. 1
The New Jersey supreme court, by extending the Prune Yard
principle to the non-commercial private university setting, without

considering the socio-demographic foundations of Prune Yard, 4 9 has
made a logically questionable quantum leap in its extension of state
judicial power. Without either statutory or decisional authority, and

in the absence of compelling social or economic policy, the court
constructed and applied a radical thesis of enforced access to private
property that impinges not only on the owner's rights to exclude
trespassers but also on his expressional freedoms from unwarranted
intrusion by unsought messages. 5 0 The court's thesis is grounded

upon facts so general that they admit of universal application, creating extreme risk of adverse consequences. Although further decisions
are required to determine the full sweep of its rationales, if Schmid is

intolerable position if state law requires it to make its private property available to
anyone who wishes to speak.
447 U.S. at 99 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
145Forced access to private property impinges on expressional as well as property rights.
Guaranteeing the expressional freedom to actively espouse political and religious causes must
also allow the right to decline to do so. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); Miami
Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
148 84 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630.
47 See notes 135-38 & 144 supra and accompanying text.
148 See 84 N.J. at 566-68, 423 A.2d at 622-33.
148 See notes 118, 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
150 Even within the state action context the United States Supreme Court recently stressed the
significance of both the availability of alternative means of access to listeners and listeners'
readiness to accept communication as important first amendment decisional criteria. In Heffron
v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 4762 (U.S. June 22, 1981),
upholding the validity of a Minnesota Public Corporation rule limiting means of soliciting
contributions on State Fair Grounds, the Court stated: "'[W]e are unwilling to say that [the] rule
. . . does not provide ISKCON ... with an adequate means to ... solicit.... The first
amendment protects the right of every citizen to 'reach the minds of willing listenersand to do so
there must be opportunity to win their attention "' Id. at 4766 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 87 (1948) (emphasis added)).
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upheld, ' 5' the court may soon be faced with a less salutary application
of its new theories. It is not uncommon for a particularly sympathetic

set of facts to color a decision to the detriment of the legal principles
involved.
Particularized findings tailored to redress unique wrongs are to
be welcomed if issues of equity are involved. 152 Constitutional standards that will be utilized as the basis of present and future holdings,

however, stand on a different footing. A court's conclusion that a
great educational institution, public or private, cannot and should not

bar the exercise of expressional freedom within its confines is apparently justifiable. '53 Viewed from another perspective, the response is
less facile. The courts should not have the power to force a right of
access to private property so that unwilling owners and occupiers
must be exposed to messages they neither seek nor wish to hear.
Theodore D. Moskowitz

The United States Supreme Court took the appeal on May 18, 1981, in Princeton Univ. v.
Schmid, 101 S. Ct. 2312 (1981).
"I A more immediate response to the facts of the case is exemplified by Aryeh Neier's
comments: "Ithe university is uncomfortable with thinking of itself as a company town. But
Princeton should derive even less comfort from being classified with shopping centers as a place
where goods may be acquired but where free trade in ideas isoff-limits." Neir, Princeton v.Free
Speech: Forbid Us Our Trespasses, 230 NATION 336, 336-37 (1980).
'53
84 N.J. at 564, 523 A.2d at 630.

